In the wake of the attacks on our country on September 11th , the Senate vote to authorize the war against terrorism was rapid, unanimous, and clear-cut. By contrast, whether to authorize the use of military force against Iraq is a far more difficult and complex question. It requires a thorough assessment of the nature and urgency of the threat and an evaluation of the possible responses.
As a member of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security and Proliferation, I have received many briefings on the dangers posed by lawless states like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea during the past five years. And during the past two months, I have attended several highly classified, in-depth briefings on Iraq from the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the White House.
I have questioned experts, including former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and former National Security Advisor Samuel Berger as well as Secretary Rumsfeld, at public hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. I have read studies and assessments, both classified and public, conducted by the Administration, the British Joint Intelligence Committee, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, among many others. And I have talked at length with Secretary of State Colin Powell about the appropriate strategy to respond to Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction.
Let me first discuss my conclusions about the nature and extent of the threat posed by the Iraqi regime and its continued defiance of United Nations resolutions.
In 1991, Iraq accepted a cease-fire agreement in the form of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 to end the Gulf War. In exchange for an end to hostilities, the Iraqi regime was required to "unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless under international supervision" of all of its chemical and biological agents, including research, development, and support facilities for their manufacture. In addition, Resolution 687 prohibited Iraq from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons, required the destruction of all ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometers, and demanded that Iraq reaffirm its obligations under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
From a series of Iraqi declarations to the UN subsequent to Resolution 687, we know that Iraq, by its own admission, had by 1991 produced thousands of tons of deadly chemical weapons such as mustard gas, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX as well as very large quantities of biological agents including anthrax, botulinum toxins, aflatoxins, and ricin. Most experts believe that Iraq's declarations grossly understated the true extent of its chemical and biological programs, but even the admitted amounts were sufficient to kill hundreds of thousands of people.
For a time in the 1990''s, UN inspectors succeeded in identifying and destroying quantities of these weapons as well as associated production facilities, ballistic missiles, and much of the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Subsequently, however, the Iraqi regime's harassment, obstruction, and deception made it impossible for the inspectors to continue their work, and they were withdrawn. At the time they left in 1998, the inspectors were unable to account for large discrepancies between the declared weapons and the amount destroyed. For example, at least 1.5 tons of the deadly nerve agent VX were unaccounted for; just under 10 milligrams of VX can cause a quick and painful death.
The CIA has concluded that all key aspects of Iraq's offensive biological and chemical weapons program -- including research and development, production, and weaponization — are active and in some cases larger and more advanced than before the Gulf War. In addition to the weapons unaccounted for in the post-Gulf War inspections, there is significant evidence since 1998 that Saddam has expanded his stockpile of chemical and biological weapons; rebuilt and expanded manufacturing sites, including mobile biological production facilities; developed more effective delivery systems, such as unmanned drones; and sought to procure materials for a nuclear bomb. The reports demonstrating Iraq's violation of UN resolutions are numerous, compelling, and indisputable. They are based on the findings of the United Nations weapons inspectors, credible reports of Iraqi defectors, sophisticated surveillance equipment, and other strong evidence. The British government also points to Iraq's continued possession of ballistic missiles over the 150 kilometer range prohibited by the UN resolution. It is estimated that Iraq has 20 al-Hussein missiles with a range of 650 kilometers. These missiles are capable of reaching Cyprus, Turkey, Iran, and Israel. Furthermore, these missiles are within range of the American servicemen and women who have been stationed in the Middle East since the end of the Gulf War.
Even more troubling is the evidence compiled by the American and British intelligence agencies that Iraq has converted its L-29 jet trainers to allow them to be used as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area.
While the evidence of Iraq's pursuit of biological and chemical weapons is overwhelming, it is more difficult to determine the state of Iraq's development of nuclear weapons. Numerous reports suggest, however, a renewed determination by Saddam to obtain materials for a nuclear bomb. A September report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) paints a chilling picture of Saddam's quest for nuclear weapons. Had the Gulf War not intervened, Iraq "could have accumulated a nuclear stockpile of a dozen or so weapons by the end of the decade," according to the report. It concludes that the scientific and technical expertise of Iraq's nuclear program remains intact. And the British government has revealed that Iraqi nuclear personnel were ordered to resume work on nuclear projects in 1998.
According to British intelligence, Iraq also has attempted to obtain uranium from Africa. Since Iraq has no active civil nuclear power program or nuclear power plants, it has no peaceful reason to procure uranium. In addition, the CIA has reported that Iraq has attempted to procure "tens of thousands" of high-strength aluminum tubes that could be used in centrifuges designed to enrich uranium to provide the fissile material for a nuclear bomb.
How soon could Iraq acquire nuclear weapons? While the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that Iraq is "probably years away from producing nuclear weapons from indigenously produced material," it points out that, if Iraq were to acquire nuclear material from a foreign source, the time frame could be reduced to perhaps a matter of months. This is a scenario that the Institute calls the "nuclear wildcard."
An independent assessment conducted by Professor Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies confirms the growing threat posed by Iraq. Professor Cordesman states that Saddam Hussein seeks weapons of mass destruction to offset American superiority in high-tech weaponry. In other words, while the United States has developed conventional weapons to be as surgical as possible and to limit unintended casualties, Iraq develops its weapons to be as blunt and as destructive as possible to instill fear in its enemies and neighbors.
In short, Saddam Hussein has continued to develop a stockpile of the deadliest chemical and biological agents known to mankind and has continued to seek nuclear weapons in defiance of his international obligations.
The more difficult question is whether the growing and serious threat posed by Saddam Hussein is sufficiently imminent to warrant the authorization of a military strike by the United States and its allies should diplomatic means of disarming Iraq fail. The President correctly noted in his recent speech that the passage of this resolution does not mean that war is imminent and unavoidable. In fact, the resolution before us is a considerable improvement over the Administration's earlier draft, which I would have opposed because of its insufficient emphasis on pursuing diplomatic means first and working through the United Nations Security Council. The bipartisan resolution, by contrast, specifically requires a presidential determination that further reliance on diplomatic or other peaceful means alone would not adequately protect our national security nor lead to the enforcement of relevant United Nations resolutions.
But nevertheless, the difficult question remains of whether the threat is so urgent that a military strike may be required and should be authorized by this resolution. The evidence of Saddam's massive build-up of the most dangerous weapons is compelling. But, as Mr. Berger pointed out in his testimony before the Armed Services Committee, the threat is not defined by capability alone. We have to probe Saddam Hussein' s intentions, as well as his capability, to determine the threat. In that regard, if as Shakespeare tells us, the past is prologue, the history of Saddam's regime gives great cause for concern.
While none of us can predict for certain whether or when Saddam would strike, there are far too many warning signs in his past behavior and present undertakings. His cold-blooded willingness to use chemical weapons against his own people as well as his enemies, his aggressive invasion of two nations, his blatant defiance of international sanctions, his continued efforts to procure materials to build a nuclear bomb, and his determined progress in developing a better means of delivering chemical and biological weapons — all strongly suggest an intention and an ability to use these weapons.
As the assessment of the British Government states, the evidence "shows that [Saddam Hussein] does not regard them [weapons of mass destruction] only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them . . . and determined to retain them, in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolutions." In fact, British intelligence reports assert that "some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them."
The history of Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq is a history of war and aggression against his enemies, his neighbors, and his own people. In graphic displays of brutality, the Iraqi regime has employed weapons of mass destruction – particularly chemical weapons – against the people of Iraq and Iran. Throughout the decade of the 1980s, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons to kill thousands of civilians. And Iraq has the means, through billions of dollars in oil revenues, to continue to develop, procure, or steal the materials it needs for its weapons.
The risks are simply too catastrophic for the world to allow Iraq to continue on its present course. But is a military response the only answer? From the beginning of this debate, I have emphasized my belief that military force should be the last resort, not the first alternative. Today, I still hold out hope that military action will not be necessary to disarm this dangerous regime. A strong United Nations resolution to compel Iraq to declare its weapons and to accept unfettered, rigorous inspections may well be successful in convincing Saddam that he must disarm. I believe that our policy should be focused on disarming Iraq rather than regime change, much as I would like Saddam Hussein to be deposed.
In making what has been a very difficult decision, I was persuaded ultimately by an extensive discussion with Secretary Powell. He has convinced me that the prospects for effective action by the United Nations to disarm Iraq depend on the credible threat of the use of force, and that is the reason I will cast my vote in favor of this resolution. Secretary Powell told me that his ability to secure a strong resolution from the UN Security Council will be strengthened enormously by bipartisan congressional approval of this authorization. As Secretary Schlesinger testified, "The greater the degree to which the President and the Congress are united in purpose with respect to Iraq, the greater is the likelihood that the United Nations will take a firm and appropriate stand towards Iraq."
Only if Saddam understands that we are prepared to use military force will a peaceful means for disarming him have a chance to succeed. All Americans share the goal of eliminating this threat without war, but we differ on how to achieve that. In my view, there are times in dealing with a tyrant when the best – indeed, perhaps the only – chance to avoid war is to express in unmistakable terms your willingness to wage it. And this, Mr. President, is one of those times.
But some understandably ask, "why now?" Has not our current policy contained Saddam? It has only if allowing him to acquire the capability to kill and destroy on a scale that far exceeds his past efforts means we have contained him. The truth is that we have not really contained Saddam; we have largely ignored him, a strategy that delays the inevitable while the stakes grow ever higher. The reason we must deal with this threat now is both clear and chilling. Given Saddam's insatiable desire to possess chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, this danger will not disappear on its own, and the price we may have to pay today to eliminate it will prove modest compared to the price we will have to pay tomorrow. As difficult as the decision to authorize military action is, one need only consider how much more difficult it will be when Saddam has a nuclear bomb.
Finally, Mr. President, I want to emphasize my strong belief that the United States should act in concert with our allies as we pursue a new Security Council resolution or in the event that we resort to military action. While the United States must always retain the right to defend itself, our prospects for dealing effectively with the Iraqi threat, our standing in the community of nations, and our ability to continue to wage an effective global effort against terrorism depend on our forging a multilateral coalition. The President deserves great credit for putting together a coalition of some 90 nations to combat terrorism. That same kind of effort must be devoted to building a coalition to confront and disarm the Iraqi regime.